If ‘doorknob’ has anominal definition, then it ought to be possible for a competent linguist or analytical philosopher to figure out what itsnominal definition is. If ‘doorknob’ has a real definition, then it ought to be possible for a science of doorknobs touncover it. But linguists and philosophers have had no luck defining ‘doorknob’ (or, as we’ve seen, anything muchelse). And there is nothing for a science of doorknobs to find out. The direction this is leading in is that if ‘doorknob’ isundefinable, that must be because being a doorknob is a primitive property. But, of course, that’s crazy. If a thing hasdoorknobhood, it does so entirely in virtue of others of the properties it has. If doorknobs don’t have hidden essences orreal definitions, that can’t possibly be because being a doorknob is one of those properties that things have simply becausethey have them; ultimates like spin, charm, charge, or the like, at which explanation ends.

Jean-marc pizano If ‘doorknob’ has anominal definition, then it ought to be possible for a competent linguist or analytical philosopher to figure out what itsnominal definition is. If ‘doorknob’ has a real definition, then it ought to be possible for a science of doorknobs touncover it. But linguists and philosophers have had no luck defining ‘doorknob’ (or, as we’ve seen, anything muchelse). And there is nothing for a science of doorknobs to find out. The direction this is leading in is that if ‘doorknob’ isundefinable, that must be because being a doorknob is a primitive property. But, of course, that’s crazy. If a thing hasdoorknobhood, it does so entirely in virtue of others of the properties it has. If doorknobs don’t have hidden essences orreal definitions, that can’t possibly be because being a doorknob is one of those properties that things have simply becausethey have them; ultimates like spin, charm, charge, or the like, at which explanation ends.

 

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So, here’s the riddle. How could ‘doorknob’ be undefinable (contrast ‘bachelor’ =df ‘unmarried man’) and lack a hidden essence (contrast water = H2O) without being metaphysically primitive (contrast spin, charm, and charge)?

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The answer (I think) is that ‘doorknob’ works like ‘red’.

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Now I suppose you want to know how ‘red’ works.

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Well, ‘red’ hasn’t got a nominal definition, and redness doesn’t have a real essence (ask any psychophysicist), and, of course, redness isn’t metaphysically ultimate. This is all OK because redness is an appearance property, and the point aboutappearance properties is that they don’t raise the question that definitions, real and nominal, propose to answer: viz.‘What is it that the things we take to be Xs have in common, over and above our taking them to be Xs?’ This is, to put itmildly, not a particularly original thing to say about red. All that’s new is the proposal to extend this sort of analysis todoorknobs and the like; the proposal is that there are lots of appearance concepts that aren’t sensory concepts.80 That this should beso is, perhaps, unsurprising on reflection. There is no obvious reason why 30a property that is constituted by the mental states that things that have it evoke in us must ipso facto be constituted by thesensory states that things that have it evoke in us.

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All right, all right; you can’t believe that something’s being a doorknob is “about us” in anything like the way that maybe something’s being red is. Surely ‘doorknob’ expresses a property that a thing either has or doesn’t, regardless ofour views; as it were, a property of things in themselves? So be it, but which property? Consider the alternatives (herewe go again): is it that ‘doorknob’ is definable? If so, what’s the definition? (And, even if ‘doorknob’ is definable, someconcepts have to be primitive, so the present sorts of issues will eventually have to be faced about them.) Is it thatdoorknobs qua doorknobs have a hidden essence? Hidden where, do you suppose? And who is in charge of finding it?Is it that being a doorknob is ontologically ultimate? You’ve got to be kidding.31

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If you take it seriously that DOORKNOB hasn’t got a conceptual analysis, and that doorknobs don’t have hidden essences, all that’s left to make something a doorknob (anyhow, all that’s left that I can think of) is how it strikes us. But ifbeing a doorknob is a property that’s constituted by how things strike us, then the intrinsic connection between the contentof DOORKNOB and the content of our doorknob-experiences is metaphysically necessary, hence not a fact that acognitivist theory of concept acquisition is required in order to explain.

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To be sure, there remains something about the acquisition of DOORKNOB that does want explaining: viz. why it is the property that these guys (several doorknobs) share, and not the property that those guys (several cows) share, thatwe lock to from experience of good (e.g. stereotypic) examples of doorknobs. And, equally certainly, it’s got to besomething about our kinds of minds that this explanation adverts to. But, I’m supposing, such an explanation iscognitivist only if it turns on the evidential relation between having the stereotypic doorknob properties and being a doorknob. (So,for example, triggering explanations aren’t

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That, however, can’t be what the lexicalsemanticist is proposing. To have ‘RED’ in the definition of ‘red’ would make ‘COLOUR’ redundant, since if ‘RED’means red, it thereby entails ‘COLOUR’. If the definition of ‘red’ includes RED, that’s all it includes, so in effect theproposal that it does concedes the concept to atomism.

Jean-marc pizano That, however, can’t be what the lexicalsemanticist is proposing. To have ‘RED’ in the definition of ‘red’ would make ‘COLOUR’ redundant, since if ‘RED’means red, it thereby entails ‘COLOUR’. If the definition of ‘red’ includes RED, that’s all it includes, so in effect theproposal that it does concedes the concept to atomism.

 

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It might be possible to treat such cases as mere curiosities specific to sensory concepts. It’s sometimes suggested that they illustrate the presence of an “iconic” element in concepts likeRED (see the discussion above of Jackendoff 1992). Maybe ‘red’ means something like ‘similar in respect of colour tothis’ where the ‘this’ ostensively introduces a red sample. The trouble with taking this line, however, is that the patternRED and the like exemplify actually appears to be quite general: lots of lexical concepts for which definitions are veryhard to find nevertheless appear to enter into the same sort of “one way” entailments that hold between ‘red’ and‘colour’. It’s plausible that ‘dog’ means animal, but there doesn’t seem to be any F (except DOG) such that ‘F +ANIMAL’ means dog ‘Chair’ means furniture, but what and FURNITURE means chair? Notice that it won’t do toappeal to ‘iconic elements’ in these non-sensory cases. Maybe ‘red’ means ‘similar in colour tothiibut ‘dog’ doesn’t mean‘similar in X tothii for any X that I can think of except doghood. It appears that, contrary to traditional Empiricistdoctrine, many lexical items are not independent but not definable either; ‘red’ entails ‘colour’ but can‘t be defined interms of it.

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A natural way to accommodate the residuum problem is to allow that some content-constitutive inferences don’t arise from definitions after all. It’s not that RED entails COLOUR because the definition of ‘red’ is COLOUR F; rather,RED just entails COLOUR full stop. Following the historical usage, I’ll call a principle of inference that institutes a‘one way relation of entailment between lexical concepts a “meaning postulate”. Rules of lexically governed inferencethat happen to be biconditional, like ‘bachelor x unmarried man’, have no special status according to the theory thatmeaning postulates are what license lexically governed inferences. This version of Inferential Role Semantics istherefore weaker than the definitional account; the latter allows a lexical concept to enter into constitutive inferentialrelations only if it is definable.

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From our perspective, the important consequence of this liberalization is that it disconnects the question whether an inference from C to Cx is content-constitutive from the question whether Cx is a syntactic part of C. Notice that it wasonly because definitions were required to be biconditional that they could be viewed as exhibiting the structuraldescription of a concept. UNMARRIED MAN can’t be the structural description of BACHELOR unless‘BACHELOR and ‘UNMARRIED MAN denote the same concept. But BACHELOR and UNMARRIED MANcan’t be the same concept unless ‘BACHELOR x UNMARRIED MAN ’ is true.

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Detaching the question whether RED entails COLOUR from the question whether COLOUR is a constituent of RED has its virtues, to be sure. We’ve been seeing how weakly the empirical evidence supports claims for the internalstructure of lexical concepts. Meaning postulates allowone to give up such claims while holding onto both “red’ means colour is analytic’ and ‘you don’t have RED unless youknow that red is a colour’. On the meaning postulate story, RED ^ COLOUR could be meaning-constitutive even ifneither RED nor COLOUR have any internal structure; i.e. even if it’s atomic.

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But no free lunch, of course. We started out this chapter by remarking that one of the nicest things about the definition story was that it explains an otherwise striking and perplexing symmetry between the metaphysics of meaning and themetaphysics of concept possession: the very inferences that are supposed to define a concept are also the ones you have to accept inorder to possess the concept. This really is striking and perplexing and not at all truistic; remember, it isn’t (can’t be) true ofall necessary inferences—or even of all a priori inferences—that they determine the conditions for possessing theconcepts involved in them. Well, the theory that concepts are definitions gets this symmetry for free; it follows fromthe fact that definitions relate concepts to their constituents.Jean-marc pizano

Auntie. Try me.

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Auntie. Try me.

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—: It’s (sigh!) keeping (Cf: “What is it that “exist” expresses in both ‘numbers exist’ and ‘chairs exist’?” Reply: “It’s (sigh!) existing”)

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In effect, what I’m selling is a disquotationallexicon. Not, however, because I think semantic facts are, somehow, merely pleonastic; but rather because I take semantic facts with full ontological seriousness, and I can’t think of a better way tosay what ‘keep’ means than to say that it means keep. If, as I suppose, the concept KEEP is an atom, it’s hardlysurprising that there’s no better way to say what ‘keep’ means than to say that it means keep.

I know of no reason, empirical or a priori, to suppose that the expressive power of English can be captured in a language whose stock of morphologically primitive expressions is interestingly smaller than the lexicon of English. Tobe sure, if you are committed to ‘keep’ being definable, and to its having the same definition in each semantic field,then you will have to face the task of saying, in words other than ‘keep’, what relation it is that keeping the money andkeeping the crowd happy both instance. But, I would have thought, saying what relation they both instance is preciselywhat the word ‘keep’ is for; why on earth do you suppose that you can say it ‘in other words’? I repeat: assuming that‘keep’

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has a definition is what makes the problem about polysemy; take away that assumption and ‘what do keeping the money and keeping the crowd happy share?’ is easy. They’re both keeping.

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Auntie. I think that’s silly, frivolous, and shallow! There is no such thing as keeping; there isn’t anything that keeping the money and keeping the crowd happy share. It’s all just made up.13

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—: Strictly speaking, that view isn’t available to Aunties who wish also to claim that ‘keep’ has a definition that is satisfied in all of its semantic fields; by definition, such a definition would express something that keeping money andkeeping crowds happy have in common. Still, I do sort of agree that ontology is at the bottom of the pile. I reservecomment till the last two chapters.

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Pinker

There is, as I remarked at the outset, a very substantial linguistic literature on lexical semantics; far more than I have the space or inclination to review. But something needs to be said, before we call it quits, about a sustained attempt thatSteven Pinker has been making (Pinker 1984; 1989) to co-opt the apparatus of lexical semantics for employment in atheory of how children learn aspects of syntax. If this project can be carried through, it might produce the kind ofreasonably unequivocal support for definitional analysis that I claim that the considerations about polysemy fail toprovide.

Pinker offers, in fact, two kinds of ontogenetic arguments for definitions; the one in Pinker 1984 depends on a “semantic bootstrapping” theory of syntax acquisition; the one in Pinker 1989, turns on an analysisof a problem in learnability theory known as “Baker’s Paradox”. Both arguments exploit rather deep assumptionsabout the architecture of theories of language development, and both have been influential; sufficiently so to justifytaking a detailed look at them. Most of the rest of this chapter will be devoted to doing that.

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The Bootstrapping Argument

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A basic idea of Pinker’s is that some of the child’s knowledge of syntactic structure is “bootstrapped” from knowledge about the semantic properties of lexical items; in particular, from knowledge about the semantic structure of verbs.The details are complicated but the outline is clear enough. In the simplest sorts of sentences (like ‘John runs’, forexample), if you can figure out what syntactic classes the words belong to (that ‘John’ is a noun and ‘runs’ is anintransitive verb) you get the rest of the syntax of the sentence more or less for free: intransitive verbs have to haveNPs as subjects, and ‘John’ is the only candidate around.

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This sort of consideration suggests that a significant part of the child’s problem of breaking into sentential syntax is identifying the syntax of lexical items. So far so good. Except that it’s not obvious how properties like being a noun orbeing an intransitive verb might signal their presence in the learner’s input since they aren’t, in general, marked byfeatures of the data that the child can unquestion-beggingly be supposed to pick up.Jean-marc pizano

If ‘doorknob’ has anominal definition, then it ought to be possible for a competent linguist or analytical philosopher to figure out what itsnominal definition is. If ‘doorknob’ has a real definition, then it ought to be possible for a science of doorknobs touncover it. But linguists and philosophers have had no luck defining ‘doorknob’ (or, as we’ve seen, anything muchelse). And there is nothing for a science of doorknobs to find out. The direction this is leading in is that if ‘doorknob’ isundefinable, that must be because being a doorknob is a primitive property. But, of course, that’s crazy. If a thing hasdoorknobhood, it does so entirely in virtue of others of the properties it has. If doorknobs don’t have hidden essences orreal definitions, that can’t possibly be because being a doorknob is one of those properties that things have simply becausethey have them; ultimates like spin, charm, charge, or the like, at which explanation ends.

Jean-marc pizano If ‘doorknob’ has anominal definition, then it ought to be possible for a competent linguist or analytical philosopher to figure out what itsnominal definition is. If ‘doorknob’ has a real definition, then it ought to be possible for a science of doorknobs touncover it. But linguists and philosophers have had no luck defining ‘doorknob’ (or, as we’ve seen, anything muchelse). And there is nothing for a science of doorknobs to find out. The direction this is leading in is that if ‘doorknob’ isundefinable, that must be because being a doorknob is a primitive property. But, of course, that’s crazy. If a thing hasdoorknobhood, it does so entirely in virtue of others of the properties it has. If doorknobs don’t have hidden essences orreal definitions, that can’t possibly be because being a doorknob is one of those properties that things have simply becausethey have them; ultimates like spin, charm, charge, or the like, at which explanation ends.

 

So, here’s the riddle. How could ‘doorknob’ be undefinable (contrast ‘bachelor’ =df ‘unmarried man’) and lack a hidden essence (contrast water = H2O) without being metaphysically primitive (contrast spin, charm, and charge)?

The answer (I think) is that ‘doorknob’ works like ‘red’.

Now I suppose you want to know how ‘red’ works.

Well, ‘red’ hasn’t got a nominal definition, and redness doesn’t have a real essence (ask any psychophysicist), and, of course, redness isn’t metaphysically ultimate. This is all OK because redness is an appearance property, and the point aboutappearance properties is that they don’t raise the question that definitions, real and nominal, propose to answer: viz.‘What is it that the things we take to be Xs have in common, over and above our taking them to be Xs?’ This is, to put itmildly, not a particularly original thing to say about red. All that’s new is the proposal to extend this sort of analysis todoorknobs and the like; the proposal is that there are lots of appearance concepts that aren’t sensory concepts.80 That this should beso is, perhaps, unsurprising on reflection. There is no obvious reason why 30a property that is constituted by the mental states that things that have it evoke in us must ipso facto be constituted by thesensory states that things that have it evoke in us.

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All right, all right; you can’t believe that something’s being a doorknob is “about us” in anything like the way that maybe something’s being red is. Surely ‘doorknob’ expresses a property that a thing either has or doesn’t, regardless ofour views; as it were, a property of things in themselves? So be it, but which property? Consider the alternatives (herewe go again): is it that ‘doorknob’ is definable? If so, what’s the definition? (And, even if ‘doorknob’ is definable, someconcepts have to be primitive, so the present sorts of issues will eventually have to be faced about them.) Is it thatdoorknobs qua doorknobs have a hidden essence? Hidden where, do you suppose? And who is in charge of finding it?Is it that being a doorknob is ontologically ultimate? You’ve got to be kidding.31

If you take it seriously that DOORKNOB hasn’t got a conceptual analysis, and that doorknobs don’t have hidden essences, all that’s left to make something a doorknob (anyhow, all that’s left that I can think of) is how it strikes us. But ifbeing a doorknob is a property that’s constituted by how things strike us, then the intrinsic connection between the contentof DOORKNOB and the content of our doorknob-experiences is metaphysically necessary, hence not a fact that acognitivist theory of concept acquisition is required in order to explain.

To be sure, there remains something about the acquisition of DOORKNOB that does want explaining: viz. why it is the property that these guys (several doorknobs) share, and not the property that those guys (several cows) share, thatwe lock to from experience of good (e.g. stereotypic) examples of doorknobs. And, equally certainly, it’s got to besomething about our kinds of minds that this explanation adverts to. But, I’m supposing, such an explanation iscognitivist only if it turns on the evidential relation between having the stereotypic doorknob properties and being a doorknob. (So,for example, triggering explanations aren’t

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That, however, can’t be what the lexicalsemanticist is proposing. To have ‘RED’ in the definition of ‘red’ would make ‘COLOUR’ redundant, since if ‘RED’means red, it thereby entails ‘COLOUR’. If the definition of ‘red’ includes RED, that’s all it includes, so in effect theproposal that it does concedes the concept to atomism.

Jean-marc pizano That, however, can’t be what the lexicalsemanticist is proposing. To have ‘RED’ in the definition of ‘red’ would make ‘COLOUR’ redundant, since if ‘RED’means red, it thereby entails ‘COLOUR’. If the definition of ‘red’ includes RED, that’s all it includes, so in effect theproposal that it does concedes the concept to atomism.

 

It might be possible to treat such cases as mere curiosities specific to sensory concepts. It’s sometimes suggested that they illustrate the presence of an “iconic” element in concepts likeRED (see the discussion above of Jackendoff 1992). Maybe ‘red’ means something like ‘similar in respect of colour tothis’ where the ‘this’ ostensively introduces a red sample. The trouble with taking this line, however, is that the patternRED and the like exemplify actually appears to be quite general: lots of lexical concepts for which definitions are veryhard to find nevertheless appear to enter into the same sort of “one way” entailments that hold between ‘red’ and‘colour’. It’s plausible that ‘dog’ means animal, but there doesn’t seem to be any F (except DOG) such that ‘F +ANIMAL’ means dog ‘Chair’ means furniture, but what and FURNITURE means chair? Notice that it won’t do toappeal to ‘iconic elements’ in these non-sensory cases. Maybe ‘red’ means ‘similar in colour tothiibut ‘dog’ doesn’t mean‘similar in X tothii for any X that I can think of except doghood. It appears that, contrary to traditional Empiricistdoctrine, many lexical items are not independent but not definable either; ‘red’ entails ‘colour’ but can‘t be defined interms of it.

Jean-marc pizano

A natural way to accommodate the residuum problem is to allow that some content-constitutive inferences don’t arise from definitions after all. It’s not that RED entails COLOUR because the definition of ‘red’ is COLOUR F; rather,RED just entails COLOUR full stop. Following the historical usage, I’ll call a principle of inference that institutes a‘one way relation of entailment between lexical concepts a “meaning postulate”. Rules of lexically governed inferencethat happen to be biconditional, like ‘bachelor x unmarried man’, have no special status according to the theory thatmeaning postulates are what license lexically governed inferences. This version of Inferential Role Semantics istherefore weaker than the definitional account; the latter allows a lexical concept to enter into constitutive inferentialrelations only if it is definable.

From our perspective, the important consequence of this liberalization is that it disconnects the question whether an inference from C to Cx is content-constitutive from the question whether Cx is a syntactic part of C. Notice that it wasonly because definitions were required to be biconditional that they could be viewed as exhibiting the structuraldescription of a concept. UNMARRIED MAN can’t be the structural description of BACHELOR unless‘BACHELOR and ‘UNMARRIED MAN denote the same concept. But BACHELOR and UNMARRIED MANcan’t be the same concept unless ‘BACHELOR x UNMARRIED MAN ’ is true.

Detaching the question whether RED entails COLOUR from the question whether COLOUR is a constituent of RED has its virtues, to be sure. We’ve been seeing how weakly the empirical evidence supports claims for the internalstructure of lexical concepts. Meaning postulates allowone to give up such claims while holding onto both “red’ means colour is analytic’ and ‘you don’t have RED unless youknow that red is a colour’. On the meaning postulate story, RED ^ COLOUR could be meaning-constitutive even ifneither RED nor COLOUR have any internal structure; i.e. even if it’s atomic.

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But no free lunch, of course. We started out this chapter by remarking that one of the nicest things about the definition story was that it explains an otherwise striking and perplexing symmetry between the metaphysics of meaning and themetaphysics of concept possession: the very inferences that are supposed to define a concept are also the ones you have to accept inorder to possess the concept. This really is striking and perplexing and not at all truistic; remember, it isn’t (can’t be) true ofall necessary inferences—or even of all a priori inferences—that they determine the conditions for possessing theconcepts involved in them. Well, the theory that concepts are definitions gets this symmetry for free; it follows fromthe fact that definitions relate concepts to their constituents.Jean-marc pizano

If ‘doorknob’ has anominal definition, then it ought to be possible for a competent linguist or analytical philosopher to figure out what itsnominal definition is. If ‘doorknob’ has a real definition, then it ought to be possible for a science of doorknobs touncover it. But linguists and philosophers have had no luck defining ‘doorknob’ (or, as we’ve seen, anything muchelse). And there is nothing for a science of doorknobs to find out. The direction this is leading in is that if ‘doorknob’ isundefinable, that must be because being a doorknob is a primitive property. But, of course, that’s crazy. If a thing hasdoorknobhood, it does so entirely in virtue of others of the properties it has. If doorknobs don’t have hidden essences orreal definitions, that can’t possibly be because being a doorknob is one of those properties that things have simply becausethey have them; ultimates like spin, charm, charge, or the like, at which explanation ends.

Jean-marc pizano If ‘doorknob’ has anominal definition, then it ought to be possible for a competent linguist or analytical philosopher to figure out what itsnominal definition is. If ‘doorknob’ has a real definition, then it ought to be possible for a science of doorknobs touncover it. But linguists and philosophers have had no luck defining ‘doorknob’ (or, as we’ve seen, anything muchelse). And there is nothing for a science of doorknobs to find out. The direction this is leading in is that if ‘doorknob’ isundefinable, that must be because being a doorknob is a primitive property. But, of course, that’s crazy. If a thing hasdoorknobhood, it does so entirely in virtue of others of the properties it has. If doorknobs don’t have hidden essences orreal definitions, that can’t possibly be because being a doorknob is one of those properties that things have simply becausethey have them; ultimates like spin, charm, charge, or the like, at which explanation ends.

 

So, here’s the riddle. How could ‘doorknob’ be undefinable (contrast ‘bachelor’ =df ‘unmarried man’) and lack a hidden essence (contrast water = H2O) without being metaphysically primitive (contrast spin, charm, and charge)?

The answer (I think) is that ‘doorknob’ works like ‘red’.

Now I suppose you want to know how ‘red’ works.

Well, ‘red’ hasn’t got a nominal definition, and redness doesn’t have a real essence (ask any psychophysicist), and, of course, redness isn’t metaphysically ultimate. This is all OK because redness is an appearance property, and the point aboutappearance properties is that they don’t raise the question that definitions, real and nominal, propose to answer: viz.‘What is it that the things we take to be Xs have in common, over and above our taking them to be Xs?’ This is, to put itmildly, not a particularly original thing to say about red. All that’s new is the proposal to extend this sort of analysis todoorknobs and the like; the proposal is that there are lots of appearance concepts that aren’t sensory concepts.80 That this should beso is, perhaps, unsurprising on reflection. There is no obvious reason why 30a property that is constituted by the mental states that things that have it evoke in us must ipso facto be constituted by thesensory states that things that have it evoke in us.

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All right, all right; you can’t believe that something’s being a doorknob is “about us” in anything like the way that maybe something’s being red is. Surely ‘doorknob’ expresses a property that a thing either has or doesn’t, regardless ofour views; as it were, a property of things in themselves? So be it, but which property? Consider the alternatives (herewe go again): is it that ‘doorknob’ is definable? If so, what’s the definition? (And, even if ‘doorknob’ is definable, someconcepts have to be primitive, so the present sorts of issues will eventually have to be faced about them.) Is it thatdoorknobs qua doorknobs have a hidden essence? Hidden where, do you suppose? And who is in charge of finding it?Is it that being a doorknob is ontologically ultimate? You’ve got to be kidding.31

If you take it seriously that DOORKNOB hasn’t got a conceptual analysis, and that doorknobs don’t have hidden essences, all that’s left to make something a doorknob (anyhow, all that’s left that I can think of) is how it strikes us. But ifbeing a doorknob is a property that’s constituted by how things strike us, then the intrinsic connection between the contentof DOORKNOB and the content of our doorknob-experiences is metaphysically necessary, hence not a fact that acognitivist theory of concept acquisition is required in order to explain.

To be sure, there remains something about the acquisition of DOORKNOB that does want explaining: viz. why it is the property that these guys (several doorknobs) share, and not the property that those guys (several cows) share, thatwe lock to from experience of good (e.g. stereotypic) examples of doorknobs. And, equally certainly, it’s got to besomething about our kinds of minds that this explanation adverts to. But, I’m supposing, such an explanation iscognitivist only if it turns on the evidential relation between having the stereotypic doorknob properties and being a doorknob. (So,for example, triggering explanations aren’t

Jean-marc pizano