For the(anyhow, my)

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intuition is very strong that there is only one way to have that concept. In particular, that there is no concept of a round square that one could have without also having ROUND and SQUARE. If you share the intuition that there is thisasymmetry, between RED SQUARE and ROUND SQUARE, then you should be very happy with IA. IA explains theasymmetry because it entails that there can be no primitive concept without a corresponding property for it to lock to.

1

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And/or among states of entertaining them. I’ll worry about this sort of ontological nicety only where it seems to matter.

2

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Why relations that depend on merely mechanical properties like frequency and contiguity should preserve intentional properties like semantic domain was whatAssociationists never could explain. That was one of the rocks they foundered on.

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3

Connectionists are committed, willy-nilly, to all mental representations being primitive; hence their well-known problems with systematicity, productivity, and the like. Moreon this in Chapter 5.

4

Not, of course, that there is anything wrong with just allowing ‘symbol’ and ‘computation’ to be interdefined. But that option is not available to anyone who takes the theory that thought is computation to be part of a naturalistic psychology; viz. part of a programme of metaphysical reduction. As Turing certainly did; and as do I.

5

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More precisely: it’s never conceptually necessary unless either the inference from Fa to a — b or the inference from Fb to a — b is itself conceptually necessary. (Forexample, let Fa be: ‘a has the property of being identical to b ’.)

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6

Or, if there is more than one way to grasp a MOP, then all of the different ways of doing so must correspond to the same way of thinking its referent. I won’t pursue thisoption in the text; suffice it that doing so wouldn’t help with the problem that I’m raising. Suppose that there is more than one way to grasp a MOP; and suppose that acertain MOP is a mode of presentation of Moe. Then if, as Frege requires, there is a MOP corresponding to each way of thinking a referent, all the ways of grasping theMoe-MOP must be the same way of thinking of Moe. I claim that, precisely because 5.3 is in force, Frege’s theory has no way to ensure that this is so.

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7

See also Smith, Medin, and Rips: “what accounts for categorization cannot account for stability [publicity] . . . [a]s long as stability of concepts is equated with sameness of concepts . . . But there is another sense of stability, which can be equated with similarity of mental contents . . . and for this sense, what accounts for categorization may at least partiallyaccount for ‘stability’ ”(1984: 268). Similar passages are simply ubiquitous in the cognitive science literature; I’m grateful to Ron Mallon for having called this example to my

8

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Alternatively, a similarity theory might suppose that what we share when our PRESIDENT concepts are similar are similar beliefs about the probabilities of certain propositions: you believe that p(presidents are CICs) = 0.98; I believe that p(presidents are CICs) = 0.95; Bill believes that p(Presidents are CICs) = 0.7; so, all else equal,your PRESIDENT concept is more like mine than Bill’s is.But this construal does nothing to discharge the basic dependence of the notion of content similarity on thenotion of content identity since what it says makes our beliefs similar is that they make similar estimates of the probability of the very same proposition; e.g. of the proposition thatpresidents are CICs. If, by contrast, the propositions to which our various probability estimates relate us are themselves supposed to be merely similar, then it does not followfrom these premisses that ceteris paribus your PRESIDENT concept is more like mine than like Bill’s.

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9

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It’s common ground that—idioms excepted—MRs that correspond to phrases (for example, the one that corresponds to “brown cow”) are typically structurally complex, so I’ve framed the definition theory as a thesis about the MRs of concepts that are expressed by lexical items. But, of course, this way of putting it relativizes the issue to thechoice of a reference language.Jean-marc pizano

Auntie. Try me.

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Auntie. Try me.

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—: It’s (sigh!) keeping (Cf: “What is it that “exist” expresses in both ‘numbers exist’ and ‘chairs exist’?” Reply: “It’s (sigh!) existing”)

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In effect, what I’m selling is a disquotationallexicon. Not, however, because I think semantic facts are, somehow, merely pleonastic; but rather because I take semantic facts with full ontological seriousness, and I can’t think of a better way tosay what ‘keep’ means than to say that it means keep. If, as I suppose, the concept KEEP is an atom, it’s hardlysurprising that there’s no better way to say what ‘keep’ means than to say that it means keep.

I know of no reason, empirical or a priori, to suppose that the expressive power of English can be captured in a language whose stock of morphologically primitive expressions is interestingly smaller than the lexicon of English. Tobe sure, if you are committed to ‘keep’ being definable, and to its having the same definition in each semantic field,then you will have to face the task of saying, in words other than ‘keep’, what relation it is that keeping the money andkeeping the crowd happy both instance. But, I would have thought, saying what relation they both instance is preciselywhat the word ‘keep’ is for; why on earth do you suppose that you can say it ‘in other words’? I repeat: assuming that‘keep’

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has a definition is what makes the problem about polysemy; take away that assumption and ‘what do keeping the money and keeping the crowd happy share?’ is easy. They’re both keeping.

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Auntie. I think that’s silly, frivolous, and shallow! There is no such thing as keeping; there isn’t anything that keeping the money and keeping the crowd happy share. It’s all just made up.13

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—: Strictly speaking, that view isn’t available to Aunties who wish also to claim that ‘keep’ has a definition that is satisfied in all of its semantic fields; by definition, such a definition would express something that keeping money andkeeping crowds happy have in common. Still, I do sort of agree that ontology is at the bottom of the pile. I reservecomment till the last two chapters.

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Pinker

There is, as I remarked at the outset, a very substantial linguistic literature on lexical semantics; far more than I have the space or inclination to review. But something needs to be said, before we call it quits, about a sustained attempt thatSteven Pinker has been making (Pinker 1984; 1989) to co-opt the apparatus of lexical semantics for employment in atheory of how children learn aspects of syntax. If this project can be carried through, it might produce the kind ofreasonably unequivocal support for definitional analysis that I claim that the considerations about polysemy fail toprovide.

Pinker offers, in fact, two kinds of ontogenetic arguments for definitions; the one in Pinker 1984 depends on a “semantic bootstrapping” theory of syntax acquisition; the one in Pinker 1989, turns on an analysisof a problem in learnability theory known as “Baker’s Paradox”. Both arguments exploit rather deep assumptionsabout the architecture of theories of language development, and both have been influential; sufficiently so to justifytaking a detailed look at them. Most of the rest of this chapter will be devoted to doing that.

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The Bootstrapping Argument

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A basic idea of Pinker’s is that some of the child’s knowledge of syntactic structure is “bootstrapped” from knowledge about the semantic properties of lexical items; in particular, from knowledge about the semantic structure of verbs.The details are complicated but the outline is clear enough. In the simplest sorts of sentences (like ‘John runs’, forexample), if you can figure out what syntactic classes the words belong to (that ‘John’ is a noun and ‘runs’ is anintransitive verb) you get the rest of the syntax of the sentence more or less for free: intransitive verbs have to haveNPs as subjects, and ‘John’ is the only candidate around.

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This sort of consideration suggests that a significant part of the child’s problem of breaking into sentential syntax is identifying the syntax of lexical items. So far so good. Except that it’s not obvious how properties like being a noun orbeing an intransitive verb might signal their presence in the learner’s input since they aren’t, in general, marked byfeatures of the data that the child can unquestion-beggingly be supposed to pick up.Jean-marc pizano

Idealism followed, of course.

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It is possible to feel that these various ways of motivating IRS, historically effective though they clearly were, are much less than overwhelmingly persuasive. For example, on reflection, it doesn’t seem that languages are a lot like gamesafter all: queens and pawns don’t mean anything, whereas ‘dog’ means dog. That’s why, though you can’t translate thequeen into French (or, a fortiori, into checkers), you can translate ‘dog’ into ‘chien’. It’s perhaps unwise to insist on ananalogy that misses so glaring a difference.

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Phonemes don’t mean anything either, so prima facie, pace Saussure, “having a phonological value” and “having a semantic value” would seem to be quite different sorts of properties. Even if it were right that phonemes areindividuated by their contrasts and equivalences—which probably they aren’t—that wouldn’t be much of a reason toclaim that words or concepts are also individuated that way.

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If, in short, one asks to hear some serious arguments for IRS, one discovers, a bit disconcertingly, that they are very thin upon the ground. I think that IRS is most of what is wrong with current theorizing in cognitive science and themetaphysics of meaning. But I don’t suppose for a minute that any short argument will, or should, persuade you toconsider junking it. I expect that will need a long argument; hence this long book. Long arguments take longer thanshort arguments, but they do sometimes create conviction.

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Accordingly, my main subject in what follows will be not the history of

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IR semantics, or the niceties of its formulation, or its evidential status, but rather its impact on empirical theories of concepts. The central consideration will be this: If you wish to hold that the content of a concept is constituted by theinferences that it enters into, you are in need of a principled way of deciding which inferences constitute which concepts. Whatprimarily distinguishes the cognitive theories we’ll consider is how they answer this question. My line will be that,though as far as anybody knows the answers they offer exhaust the options, pretty clearly none of them can be right.Not, NB, that they are incoherent, or otherwise confused; just that they fail to satisfy the empirical constraints ontheories of concepts that I’ve been enumerating, and are thus, almost certainly, false.

At that point, I hope that abandoning IRS in favour of the sort of atomistic, informational semantics that I tentatively endorsed in Chapter 1 will begin to appear to be the rational thing to do. I’ll say something in Chapter 6 about whatthis sort of alternative to IRS might be like.

So much for the first of my two concluding addenda. Here is the second:

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I promised you in Chapter 1 that I wouldn’t launch yet another defence of RTM; I proposed—aside from my admittedly tendentious endorsement of informational semantics—simply to take RTM for granted as the context inwhich problems about the nature of concepts generally arise these days. I do mean to stick to this policy. Mostly. But Ican’t resist rounding off these two introductory chapters by remarking how nicely the pieces fit when you put them alltogether. I’m going to exercise my hobby-horse after all, but only a little.

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In effect, in these introductory discussions, we’ve been considering constraints on a theory of cognition that emerge from two widely different, and largely independent, research enterprises. On the one hand, there’s the attempt to savethe architecture of a Fregean—viz. a purely referential—theory of meaning by taking seriously the idea that conceptscan be distinguished by their ‘modes of presentation’ of their extensions. It‘s supposed to be modes of presentationthat answer the question ‘How can coreferential concepts be distinct?’ Here Frege’s motives concur with those ofInformational Semantics; since both are referential theories of content, both need a story about how thinking about theMorning Star could be different from thinking about the Evening Star, given that the two thoughts are connected withthe same ‘thing in the world’.

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The project of saving the Frege programme faces two major hurdles. First, ‘Mates cases’ appear to show that modes of presentations can‘t be senses.Jean-marc pizano

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Похожие записи:
  1. 3 The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist’sTale

1 Philosophical Introduction: The BackgroundTheory

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1 Philosophical Introduction: The Background

Theory

Needless to say, this rather baroque belief system gave rise to incredibly complicated explanations by the tribal elders . . .

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—Will Self

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My topic is what concepts are. Since I’m interested in that question primarily as it arises in the context of ‘representational’ theories of mind (RTMs), a natural way to get started would be for me to tell you about RTMs andabout how they raise the question what concepts are. I could then set out my answer, and you could tell me, by return,what you think is wrong with it. The ensuing discussion would be abstract and theory laden, no doubt; but, with anyluck, philosophically innocent.

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That is, in fact, pretty much the course that I propose to follow. But, for better or for worse, in the present climate of philosophical opinion it’s perhaps not possible just to plunge in and do so. RTMs have all sorts of problems, both ofsubstance and of form. Many of you may suppose the whole project of trying to construct one is hopelessly wrongheaded; if it is, then who cares what RTMs say about concepts? So I guess I owe you some sort of general argumentthat the project isn’t hopelessly wrong-headed. Jean-marc pizano

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But I seem to have grown old writing books defending RTMs; it occurs to me that if I were to stop writing books defending RTMs, perhaps I would stop growing old. So I think I’ll tell you a joke instead. It’s an old joke, as befits mytelling it.

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Oldjoke-. Once upon a time a disciple went to his guru and said: ‘Guru, what is life?’ To which the Guru replies, after much thinking, ‘My Son, life is like a fountain.’ The disciple is outraged. ‘Is that the best that you can do? Is that whatyou call wisdom?’ ‘All right,’ says the guru; ‘don’t get excited. So maybe it‘s not like a fountain.’

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That’s the end of the joke, but it’s not the end of the story. The guru noticed that taking this line was losing him clients, and gurus have to eat.

So the next time a disciple asked him: ‘Guru, what is life?’ his answer was: ‘My Son, I cannot tell you.’ ‘Why can’t you?’ the disciple wanted to know. ‘Because,’ the guru said, ‘the question “What is having a life?” is logically prior.’ ‘Gee,’ saidthe disciple, ‘that’s pretty interesting’; and he signed on for the whole term.

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I’m not going to launch a full-dress defence of RTM; but I do want to start with a little methodological stuff about whether having a concept is logically prior to being a concept, and what difference, if any, that makes to theorizingabout mental representation.

It’s a general truth that if you know what an X is, then you also know what it is to have an X. And ditto the other way around. This applies to concepts in particular: the question what they are and the question what it is to have them arelogically linked; if you commit yourself on one, you are thereby committed, willy nilly, on the other. Suppose, forexample, that your theory is that concepts are pumpkins. Very well then, it will have to be a part of your theory thathaving a concept is having a pumpkin. And, conversely: if your theory is that having a concept is having a pumpkin,then it will have to be a part of your theory that pumpkins are what concepts are. I suppose this all to be truistic.  Jean-marc pizano

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Now, until quite recently (until this century, anyhow) practically everybody took it practically for granted that the explanation of concept possession should be parasitic on the explanation of concept individuation. First you say what it isfor something to be the concept X—you give the concept’s ‘identity conditions’—and then having the concept X is justhaving whatever the concept X turns out to be. But the philosophical fashions have changed. Almost without exception,current theories about concepts reverse the classical direction of analysis. Their substance lies in what they say aboutthe conditions for having concept X, and it’s the story about being concept X that they treat as derivative.

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Tante. Versuchen Sie mich.

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Tante. Versuchen Sie mich.

—: Es ist (seufz!) Halten (Cf: “Was ist es, “existieren” drückt in beiden ‘Zahlen gibt es’ und ‘Stühle vorhanden’?” Antwort: “Es ist (seufz!) Bestehenden”)

In der Tat, was ich verkaufe ist ein disquotationallexicon. Jedoch nicht, weil ich denke semantische Fakten sind, irgendwie, nur Pleonasmus; sondern weil ich semantischen Tatsachen mit voller Ernsthaftigkeit ontologischen zu nehmen, und Ich kann mir keine bessere Art und Weise denken, was tosay ‘halten’ bedeutet, als zu sagen, dass es bedeutet, zu halten. Wenn, wie ich vermute, ist das Konzept halten ein Atom, es hardlysurprising, dass es keinen besseren Weg, zu sagen, was ‘halten’ bedeutet, als zu sagen, dass es bedeutet, zu halten.

Ich weiß von nicht Grund empirischer oder a priori anzunehmen, dass die Ausdruckskraft der Englisch kann, in einer Sprache, deren Aktien morphologisch primitive Ausdrücke ist interessanter kleiner als der Wortschatz der englischen erfasst werden. Tobe sicher, ob Sie verpflichtet sind ‘halten’ definierbar, und seine mit der gleichen Definition in jedem Wortfeld, dann haben Sie, um die Aufgabe zu sagen, Gesicht, in anderen als Worte ‘halten’, Welche Beziehung es ist, dass das Geld zu behalten andkeeping das Publikum glücklich beide Instanz. Aber ich hätte gedacht, und sagte, in welcher Beziehung sie beide Instanz preciselywhat des Wortes ist ‘halten’ ist für; warum auf der Erde, glauben Sie, dass Sie es sagen ‘mit anderen Worten’? Ich wiederhole: der Annahme, dass‘halten’

hat eine Definition ist, was das Problem über Polysemie macht; nehmen, dass die Übernahme und ‘was tun wenn das Geld und halten das Publikum glücklich Aktie?’ ist einfach. Sie sind beide zu halten.

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Tante. Ich denke, das ist albern, frivol, und flach! Es gibt nicht so etwas wie Haltung; es gibt nichts, was das Geld zu halten und halten das Publikum glücklich Aktie. Es ist alles nur gemacht up.13

—: Streng genommen ist diese Ansicht nicht verfügbar zu Tanten, die sich zu behaupten, dass ‘halten’ hat eine Definition, die in allen erfüllt ist von seiner semantischen Felder; durch Definition, eine solche Definition würde etwas, das halten Geld andkeeping Massen glücklich gemeinsam haben, zum Ausdruck bringen. Dennoch glaube ich irgendwie einig, dass Ontologie ist an der Unterseite des Haufens. Ich reservecomment bis in die letzten beiden Kapiteln.

Pinker

Es gibt, wie ich am Anfang, einem sehr erheblichen sprachlichen Literatur über lexikalische Semantik, bemerkte; weit mehr, als ich den Raum oder die Neigung zu überprüfen. Aber etwas muss zu gesagt werden, bevor wir nennen es beendet wird, um eine anhaltende Versuch thatSteven Pinker macht seit (Pinker 1984 1989) zu kooptieren die Vorrichtung der lexikalischen Semantik für die Beschäftigung in atheory, wie Kinder Aspekte der Syntax lernen. Wenn dies Projekt können sein durchgesetzt, könnte es die Art ofreasonably eindeutige Unterstützung für definitorische Analyse, die behaupten, dass ich produzieren die Überlegungen zu Polysemie nicht toprovide.

Pinker Angebote in der Tat, zwei Arten von ontogenetischen Argumente für Definitionen; Der in Pinker 1984 hängt ein “semantische Bootstrapping” Theorie der Syntax Erwerb; Der in Pinker 1989 dreht sich auf ein analysisof ein Problem in Erlernbarkeit Theorie als bekannt “Bäcker Paradox”. Beide Argumente nutzen eher tief assumptionsabout der Architektur der Theorien der Sprachentwicklung, und beide waren einfluss; ausreichend, um so justifytaking einen detaillierten Blick auf sie. Die meisten der Rest dieses Kapitels zu tun, dass gewidmet sein.

Das Bootstrapping Argument

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Ein Grundgedanke der Pinker ist, dass einige der Kenntnis der syntaktischen Struktur des Kindes “Bootstrap” von Wissen über die semantischen Eigenschaften der lexikalischen Einheiten; Insbesondere aufgrund des Wissens über die semantische Struktur verbs.The Details sind kompliziert, aber der Umriss ist deutlich genug. In die einfachsten Arten von Sätzen (wie ‘John läuft’, Beispielsweise), wenn Sie herausfinden können, was syntaktische Klassen die Worte gehören (das ‘John’ ist ein Substantiv und ‘Läufe’ wird anintransitive Verb) erhalten Sie den Rest der Syntax der Satz mehr oder weniger kostenlos: intransitive Verben haben zu haveNPs als Subjekte, und ‘John’ ist der einzige Kandidat um.

Diese Art der Betrachtung legt nahe, dass ein erheblicher Teil der Problematik der in Aussagen Syntax brechen des Kindes ist die Ermittlung der Syntax der lexikalischen Einheiten. So soweit so gut. Außer, dass es nicht offensichtlich ist, wie Eigenschaften wie ein Substantiv orbeing intransitives Verb könnte ihre Anwesenheit im Eingang des Lernenden zu signalisieren, da sie es nicht sind, in der Regel markiert byfeatures der Daten, die das Kind unquestion-beggingly angenommen werden, zu holen.Jean-Marc pizano

For the(anyhow, my)

Jean-marc pizano For the(anyhow, my)

 

intuition is very strong that there is only one way to have that concept. In particular, that there is no concept of a round square that one could have without also having ROUND and SQUARE. If you share the intuition that there is thisasymmetry, between RED SQUARE and ROUND SQUARE, then you should be very happy with IA. IA explains theasymmetry because it entails that there can be no primitive concept without a corresponding property for it to lock to.

1

And/or among states of entertaining them. I’ll worry about this sort of ontological nicety only where it seems to matter.

2

Why relations that depend on merely mechanical properties like frequency and contiguity should preserve intentional properties like semantic domain was whatAssociationists never could explain. That was one of the rocks they foundered on.

3

Connectionists are committed, willy-nilly, to all mental representations being primitive; hence their well-known problems with systematicity, productivity, and the like. Moreon this in Chapter 5.

4

Not, of course, that there is anything wrong with just allowing ‘symbol’ and ‘computation’ to be interdefined. But that option is not available to anyone who takes the theory that thought is computation to be part of a naturalistic psychology; viz. part of a programme of metaphysical reduction. As Turing certainly did; and as do I.

5

More precisely: it’s never conceptually necessary unless either the inference from Fa to a — b or the inference from Fb to a — b is itself conceptually necessary. (Forexample, let Fa be: ‘a has the property of being identical to b ’.)

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6

Or, if there is more than one way to grasp a MOP, then all of the different ways of doing so must correspond to the same way of thinking its referent. I won’t pursue thisoption in the text; suffice it that doing so wouldn’t help with the problem that I’m raising. Suppose that there is more than one way to grasp a MOP; and suppose that acertain MOP is a mode of presentation of Moe. Then if, as Frege requires, there is a MOP corresponding to each way of thinking a referent, all the ways of grasping theMoe-MOP must be the same way of thinking of Moe. I claim that, precisely because 5.3 is in force, Frege’s theory has no way to ensure that this is so.

7

See also Smith, Medin, and Rips: “what accounts for categorization cannot account for stability [publicity] . . . [a]s long as stability of concepts is equated with sameness of concepts . . . But there is another sense of stability, which can be equated with similarity of mental contents . . . and for this sense, what accounts for categorization may at least partiallyaccount for ‘stability’ ”(1984: 268). Similar passages are simply ubiquitous in the cognitive science literature; I’m grateful to Ron Mallon for having called this example to my

8

Alternatively, a similarity theory might suppose that what we share when our PRESIDENT concepts are similar are similar beliefs about the probabilities of certain propositions: you believe that p(presidents are CICs) = 0.98; I believe that p(presidents are CICs) = 0.95; Bill believes that p(Presidents are CICs) = 0.7; so, all else equal,your PRESIDENT concept is more like mine than Bill’s is.But this construal does nothing to discharge the basic dependence of the notion of content similarity on thenotion of content identity since what it says makes our beliefs similar is that they make similar estimates of the probability of the very same proposition; e.g. of the proposition thatpresidents are CICs. If, by contrast, the propositions to which our various probability estimates relate us are themselves supposed to be merely similar, then it does not followfrom these premisses that ceteris paribus your PRESIDENT concept is more like mine than like Bill’s.

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9

It’s common ground that—idioms excepted—MRs that correspond to phrases (for example, the one that corresponds to “brown cow”) are typically structurally complex, so I’ve framed the definition theory as a thesis about the MRs of concepts that are expressed by lexical items. But, of course, this way of putting it relativizes the issue to thechoice of a reference language.Jean-marc pizano

Idealismus gefolgt, natürlich.

Jean-Marc pizano Idealismus gefolgt, natürlich.

 

Es möglich ist, zu spüren, dass diese verschiedenen Wegen, IRS, historisch wirksam, obwohl sie eindeutig waren, sind viel weniger als überwiegend überzeugend. Zum Beispiel auf Reflexion, scheint es nicht, dass die Sprachen sind viel wie alle gamesafter: Königinnen und Bauern bedeuten nichts, während ‘Hund’ bedeutet Hund. Das ist, warum, wenn Sie nicht übersetzen kann thequeen in Französisch (und erst recht in Dame), können Sie übersetzen kann ‘Hund’ in ‘chien’. Es ist vielleicht nicht ratsam, auf ananalogy, die darauf bestehen, verfehlt so eklatante Unterschied.

Phoneme nichts entweder bedeuten, so auf den ersten Blick, Tempo Saussure, “mit einer phonologischen Wert” und “mit einem semantischen Wert” würde zu scheinen sein ganz verschiedene Arten von Eigenschaften. Auch wenn es richtig, dass Phoneme durch ihre Gegensätze und Gleichwertigkeiten areindividuated waren—die wahrscheinlich sind sie nicht—das würde nicht viel von einem Grund toclaim, die Worte oder Konzepte werden auch auf diese Weise individualisiert werden.

Wenn, kurz, fragt man, um einige ernsthafte Argumente für IRS zu hören, man entdeckt, ein bisschen beunruhigend, dass sie sehr dünn auf dem Boden sind. Ich denke, dass IRS ist das meiste, was falsch mit aktuellen Theoriebildung in der Kognitionswissenschaft und themetaphysics von Bedeutung ist. Aber ich glaube nicht eine Minute, dass jede kurze Argument, oder sollte, überreden Sie toconsider junking es annehmen. Ich erwarte, dass ein langer Streit müssen; damit diese lange Buch. Lange Argumente mehr thanshort Argumente, aber sie haben manchmal schaffen Überzeugung.

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Dementsprechend wird mein Hauptthema in dem, was folgt, nicht die Geschichte sein

IR-Semantik, oder die Feinheiten der Formulierung, oder seine Beweisstatus, sondern seine Auswirkungen auf empirischer Theorien der Konzepte. Die zentrale Überlegung wird sein: Wenn Sie es wünschen zu halten, dass der Inhalt eines Konzepts wird gebildet durch theinferences, dass es in, Sie tritt sind in der Notwendigkeit einer prinzipiellen Möglichkeit, zu entscheiden, welche darstellen, welche Konzepte Schlüsse. Whatprimarily unterscheidet die kognitiven Theorien wir betrachten, ist, wie sie antworten dies Frage. Meine Linie wird sein, dass, obwohl so weit wie jemand die Antworten kennt sie bieten die Optionen ausschöpfen, ziemlich deutlich keiner von ihnen kann right.Not werden, NB, dass sie inkohärent oder anderweitig verwirrt; nur, dass sie nicht zu erfüllen die empirischen Einschränkungen ontheories von Konzepten, die ich aufgezählt habe, und sind somit fast sicher, falsch.

An diesem Punkt, ich hoffe, dass die Aufgabe IRS in für die Art von atomistischen, Informations-Semantik, die ich versuchsweise in Kapitel 1 gebilligt werden beginnen zu erscheinen, um die rationale Sache zu tun. Ich werde etwas in Kapitel 6 über whatthis Art Alternative zu IRS aussehen könnte sagen.

So viel zum ersten meiner beiden abschließenden Zusätzen. Hier ist die Sekunde:

Ich dir versprochen in Kapitel 1, dass ich noch eine weitere Verteidigung der RTM nicht starten; Ich schlug vor,—abgesehen von meiner zugegebenermaßen tendenziösen Billigung des Informations Semantik—einfach RTM dauern als Kontext inwhich Probleme über die Natur der Konzepte entstehen in der Regel in diesen Tagen erteilt. Ich meine, um an dieser Politik festhalten. Meistens. Aber Ican’t wider Abrundung diese zwei einleitenden Kapiteln mit der Bemerkung, wie schön die Stücke passen, wenn Sie sie alltogether setzen. Ich werde mein Steckenpferd, nachdem alle ausüben, aber nur ein wenig.

Jean-Marc pizano

In der Tat, in diesen einleitenden Diskussionen, die wir in Erwägung gezogen habe Zwänge auf einer Erkenntnistheorie, die von zwei sehr unterschiedlichen und weitgehend unabhängig, Forschungsunternehmen entstehen. Auf der einen Seite gibt es den Versuch, die Architektur eines Fregesche savethe—nämlich. eine rein Referenz—Theorie der Bedeutung, indem sie den Gedanken ernst, die durch ihre unterschieden werden conceptscan ‘Modi von Präsentation’ ihre Erweiterungen. Es‘S soll zu werden Arten presentationthat die Frage beantworten, ‘Wie kann coreferential Konzepte unterschiedlich sein?’ Hier Freges Motive stimmen mit jenen ofInformational Semantik; da beide Referenz Theorien von Inhalten, müssen sowohl eine Geschichte darüber, wie Gedanken über theMorning Star kann sich von Gedanken über die Evening Star zu sein, da die beiden Gedanken withthe gleichen verbunden ‘Sache der Welt’.

Das Projekt zur Rettung der Frege-Programm vor zwei großen Hürden. Zuerst ‘Mates Fällen’ erscheinen, um zu zeigen, dass Formen der Präsentationen können‘T Sinne.Jean-Marc pizano

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