For the(anyhow, my)

Jean-marc pizano For the(anyhow, my)

 

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intuition is very strong that there is only one way to have that concept. In particular, that there is no concept of a round square that one could have without also having ROUND and SQUARE. If you share the intuition that there is thisasymmetry, between RED SQUARE and ROUND SQUARE, then you should be very happy with IA. IA explains theasymmetry because it entails that there can be no primitive concept without a corresponding property for it to lock to.

1

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And/or among states of entertaining them. I’ll worry about this sort of ontological nicety only where it seems to matter.

2

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Why relations that depend on merely mechanical properties like frequency and contiguity should preserve intentional properties like semantic domain was whatAssociationists never could explain. That was one of the rocks they foundered on.

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3

Connectionists are committed, willy-nilly, to all mental representations being primitive; hence their well-known problems with systematicity, productivity, and the like. Moreon this in Chapter 5.

4

Not, of course, that there is anything wrong with just allowing ‘symbol’ and ‘computation’ to be interdefined. But that option is not available to anyone who takes the theory that thought is computation to be part of a naturalistic psychology; viz. part of a programme of metaphysical reduction. As Turing certainly did; and as do I.

5

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More precisely: it’s never conceptually necessary unless either the inference from Fa to a — b or the inference from Fb to a — b is itself conceptually necessary. (Forexample, let Fa be: ‘a has the property of being identical to b ’.)

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6

Or, if there is more than one way to grasp a MOP, then all of the different ways of doing so must correspond to the same way of thinking its referent. I won’t pursue thisoption in the text; suffice it that doing so wouldn’t help with the problem that I’m raising. Suppose that there is more than one way to grasp a MOP; and suppose that acertain MOP is a mode of presentation of Moe. Then if, as Frege requires, there is a MOP corresponding to each way of thinking a referent, all the ways of grasping theMoe-MOP must be the same way of thinking of Moe. I claim that, precisely because 5.3 is in force, Frege’s theory has no way to ensure that this is so.

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7

See also Smith, Medin, and Rips: “what accounts for categorization cannot account for stability [publicity] . . . [a]s long as stability of concepts is equated with sameness of concepts . . . But there is another sense of stability, which can be equated with similarity of mental contents . . . and for this sense, what accounts for categorization may at least partiallyaccount for ‘stability’ ”(1984: 268). Similar passages are simply ubiquitous in the cognitive science literature; I’m grateful to Ron Mallon for having called this example to my

8

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Alternatively, a similarity theory might suppose that what we share when our PRESIDENT concepts are similar are similar beliefs about the probabilities of certain propositions: you believe that p(presidents are CICs) = 0.98; I believe that p(presidents are CICs) = 0.95; Bill believes that p(Presidents are CICs) = 0.7; so, all else equal,your PRESIDENT concept is more like mine than Bill’s is.But this construal does nothing to discharge the basic dependence of the notion of content similarity on thenotion of content identity since what it says makes our beliefs similar is that they make similar estimates of the probability of the very same proposition; e.g. of the proposition thatpresidents are CICs. If, by contrast, the propositions to which our various probability estimates relate us are themselves supposed to be merely similar, then it does not followfrom these premisses that ceteris paribus your PRESIDENT concept is more like mine than like Bill’s.

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9

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It’s common ground that—idioms excepted—MRs that correspond to phrases (for example, the one that corresponds to “brown cow”) are typically structurally complex, so I’ve framed the definition theory as a thesis about the MRs of concepts that are expressed by lexical items. But, of course, this way of putting it relativizes the issue to thechoice of a reference language.Jean-marc pizano

John showed his etchings to Mary

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Or consider:

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John showed his etchings to Mary/John showed Mary his etchings.

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but

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John exhibited his etchings to Mary/*John exhibited Mary his etchings.

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Is it that Mary is in metaphorical possession of etchings that are shown to her but not of etchings that are exhibited to her? How is one to tell? More to the point, how is the child to tell? Remember that, according to Pinker’s story, the childfigures out that ‘exhibit’ doesn’t dative-move when hedecides that it doesn’t—even metaphorically—express prospective possession. But how on earth does he decide that?31

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I should emphasize that Pinker is explicitly aware that there are egregious exceptions to his semantic characterization of the constraints on dative movement, nor does he suppose that appeals to “metaphorical possession” and the likecan always be relied on to get him off the hook. At least one of the things that he thinks is going on with the doubleobject construction is a morphological constraint on dative movement: polysyllabic verbs tend to resist it (notice show/*exhibit; tell/*repeat in the examples above). But though Pinker remarks upon the existence of such non-semanticconstraints, he appears not to see how much trouble they make for his view.

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Remember the architecture of Pinker’s argument. What’s on offer is an inference from ontogenetic considerations to the conclusion that there are definitions. What shows that there are definitions is that there is a semantic level oflinguistic representation at which verbs are lexically decomposed. What shows that there are semantic-levelrepresentations is that you need semantic vocabulary to formulate the hypotheses that the child projects in the courseof learning the lexicon; and that’s because, according to Pinker, these hypotheses express correlations between certainsemantic properties of lexical items, on the one hand, and the grammatical structures that the items occur in, on theother. Double-object constructions, as we’ve seen, are supposed to be paradigms.

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But it now appears that the vocabulary required to specify the conditions on such constructions isn’t purely semantic after all; not even according to Pinker. To predict whether a verb permits dative movement, 15you need to know not only whether it expresses (literally or metaphorically) ‘prospective possession’, but also thepertinent facts about its morphology. What account of the representation of lexical structure does this observationimply? The point to notice is that there isn’t, on anybody’s story, any one level of representation that specifies both thesemantic and the morphological features of a lexical item. In particular, it’s a defining property of the (putative)semantic level that it abstracts from the sorts of (morphological, phonological, syntactic, etc.) properties that distinguishbetween synonyms. For example, the semantic level is supposed not to distinguish the representation of (e.g.)“bachelor” from the representation of “unmarried man”, the representation of “kill” from the representation of “causeto die”, and so forth.

Well, if that’s what the semantic level is, and if the facts about morphological constraints on double-object structures are as we (and Pinker) are supposing them to be, then the moral is that there is no level of linguistic representation atwhich the constraints on dative movement can be expressed: not the morphological level because (assuming thatPinker’s story about “prospective possession” is true) morphological representation abstracts from the semanticproperties on which dative movement is contingent. And, precisely analogously, not the semantic level because semanticlevel representation abstracts from the morphological properties of lexical items on which dative movement is alsocontingent.

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Time to pull this all together and see where the argument has gotten. Since heaven only knows what “prospective possession” is, there’s no seriously evaluating the claim that dative movement turns on whether a verb expresses it.What does seem clear, however, is that even if there are semantic constraints on the syntactic behaviour of doubleobject verbs, there are also morphological constraints on their syntactic behaviour. So to state such generalizations at asingle linguistic level, you would need to postulate not semantic representations but morphosemantic representations. It is,however, common ground that there is no level of representation in whose vocabulary morphological and semanticconstraints can be simultaneously imposed.

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This isn’t a paradox; it is perfectly possible to formulate conditions that depend, simultaneously, on semantic and morphological properties of lexical items without assuming that there is a semantic level (and, for that matter, withoutassuming that there is a morphological level either).Jean-marc pizano

For the(anyhow, my)

Jean-marc pizano For the(anyhow, my)

 

intuition is very strong that there is only one way to have that concept. In particular, that there is no concept of a round square that one could have without also having ROUND and SQUARE. If you share the intuition that there is thisasymmetry, between RED SQUARE and ROUND SQUARE, then you should be very happy with IA. IA explains theasymmetry because it entails that there can be no primitive concept without a corresponding property for it to lock to.

1

And/or among states of entertaining them. I’ll worry about this sort of ontological nicety only where it seems to matter.

2

Why relations that depend on merely mechanical properties like frequency and contiguity should preserve intentional properties like semantic domain was whatAssociationists never could explain. That was one of the rocks they foundered on.

3

Connectionists are committed, willy-nilly, to all mental representations being primitive; hence their well-known problems with systematicity, productivity, and the like. Moreon this in Chapter 5.

4

Not, of course, that there is anything wrong with just allowing ‘symbol’ and ‘computation’ to be interdefined. But that option is not available to anyone who takes the theory that thought is computation to be part of a naturalistic psychology; viz. part of a programme of metaphysical reduction. As Turing certainly did; and as do I.

5

More precisely: it’s never conceptually necessary unless either the inference from Fa to a — b or the inference from Fb to a — b is itself conceptually necessary. (Forexample, let Fa be: ‘a has the property of being identical to b ’.)

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6

Or, if there is more than one way to grasp a MOP, then all of the different ways of doing so must correspond to the same way of thinking its referent. I won’t pursue thisoption in the text; suffice it that doing so wouldn’t help with the problem that I’m raising. Suppose that there is more than one way to grasp a MOP; and suppose that acertain MOP is a mode of presentation of Moe. Then if, as Frege requires, there is a MOP corresponding to each way of thinking a referent, all the ways of grasping theMoe-MOP must be the same way of thinking of Moe. I claim that, precisely because 5.3 is in force, Frege’s theory has no way to ensure that this is so.

7

See also Smith, Medin, and Rips: “what accounts for categorization cannot account for stability [publicity] . . . [a]s long as stability of concepts is equated with sameness of concepts . . . But there is another sense of stability, which can be equated with similarity of mental contents . . . and for this sense, what accounts for categorization may at least partiallyaccount for ‘stability’ ”(1984: 268). Similar passages are simply ubiquitous in the cognitive science literature; I’m grateful to Ron Mallon for having called this example to my

8

Alternatively, a similarity theory might suppose that what we share when our PRESIDENT concepts are similar are similar beliefs about the probabilities of certain propositions: you believe that p(presidents are CICs) = 0.98; I believe that p(presidents are CICs) = 0.95; Bill believes that p(Presidents are CICs) = 0.7; so, all else equal,your PRESIDENT concept is more like mine than Bill’s is.But this construal does nothing to discharge the basic dependence of the notion of content similarity on thenotion of content identity since what it says makes our beliefs similar is that they make similar estimates of the probability of the very same proposition; e.g. of the proposition thatpresidents are CICs. If, by contrast, the propositions to which our various probability estimates relate us are themselves supposed to be merely similar, then it does not followfrom these premisses that ceteris paribus your PRESIDENT concept is more like mine than like Bill’s.

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9

It’s common ground that—idioms excepted—MRs that correspond to phrases (for example, the one that corresponds to “brown cow”) are typically structurally complex, so I’ve framed the definition theory as a thesis about the MRs of concepts that are expressed by lexical items. But, of course, this way of putting it relativizes the issue to thechoice of a reference language.Jean-marc pizano